OpenSSL security report

Sorry if you'd rather this be mentioned elsewhere, or you already know because you're probably on an alert mailing list but ...

https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt

OpenSSL Security Advisory [9 Jul 2015]

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Alternative chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793)

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Severity: High

 

During certificate verification, OpenSSL (starting from version 1.0.1n and

1.0.2b) will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first

attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this

logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted

certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid

leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate.

 

This issue will impact any application that verifies certificates including

SSL/TLS/DTLS clients and SSL/TLS/DTLS servers using client authentication.

 

This issue affects OpenSSL versions 1.0.2c, 1.0.2b, 1.0.1n and 1.0.1o.

 

OpenSSL 1.0.2b/1.0.2c users should upgrade to 1.0.2d

OpenSSL 1.0.1n/1.0.1o users should upgrade to 1.0.1p

 

This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 24th June 2015 by Adam Langley/David

Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). The fix was developed by the BoringSSL project.

 

Note

====

 

As per our previous announcements and our Release Strategy

(https://www.openssl.org/about/releasestrat.html), support for OpenSSL versions

1.0.0 and 0.9.8 will cease on 31st December 2015. No security updates for these

releases will be provided after that date. Users of these releases are advised

to upgrade.

 

References

==========

 

URL for this Security Advisory:

https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20150709.txt

 

Note: the online version of the advisory may be updated with additional

details over time.

 

For details of OpenSSL severity classifications please see:

https://www.openssl.org/about/secpolicy.html