L0rdRaiden

Members
  • Posts

    568
  • Joined

  • Last visited

Everything posted by L0rdRaiden

  1. This is the solution https://askubuntu.com/a/226499
  2. Sorry to rescue this old thread. I was about to purchase this melanox model but seen that is not fully compatible is a problem. Is there any other 40G card or better that is fully compatible with unraid and can be purchased used with a good price? I have found the intel XL710-QDA1 but it cost almost 3 times more in ebay
  3. Could you add an option to select several docker compose stacks to execute de actions Start / Stop / Update. Executing each stack in parallel if it's possible or in series. I have quite a few right now and going 1 by 1 waiting for each to go with the next one is... slow.
  4. What should I use in my applications? is there any difference or advange? performance? security? features? /mnt/data/Video (ZFS way) or /mnt/user/Video (unraid way)
  5. Still it would be nice if unRAID could give a better support or official support to docker compose
  6. Why do you recommend to use eth0 instead of vhost0? I'm planning to build this, the only change is that the docker0,1,2 will actually be lxc containers with docker inside. Each lxc would have 2 interfaces assigned, one for administration of the lxc OS and another one for docker. Ideally I would like to use macvlan in docker in order to have different IP's per container, but not sure yet how this will play over LXC. Maybe doing a bypass of the virtual nics inside lxc with facilitate everything. Or maybe instead using different bridges to split the traffic I could creat vlans in eth0/vhost0 and assign 2 of the to each lxc and use macvlan on top of that for lxc and the docker inside lxc I don't have yet a clear picture of the approach so unless I get some help I guess I will get it via the trial and error approach I might find other problems with the storage at some point https://github.com/nextcloud/all-in-one/discussions/1490
  7. Anyone is having problems using macvlan in lxc over linux bridges? In unraid mixing docker macvlan with linux bridges causes "call traces" will the same happen with lxc? I know there is a workaround but I'm still interested in using bridges and not just phisical nic + macvlan https://docs.unraid.net/unraid-os/release-notes/6.12.4/
  8. @limetech I saw you have openned a bug in relation of the call traces when using macvlan over linux bridges, on linux kernel. I know that linux packages are linux packages but not all the kernels are compiled with the same options. On Google I don't see anyone having this issues that is not related with unraid, have you tried to reproduce this on debian 12 or rhel 8, 9 or any other distro? https://bugzilla.kernel.org/show_bug.cgi?id=217777 Maybe this? https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1091779
  9. You are embarrassing yourself kid. It must be hard being wrong for several posts and recognize it so you make the ball bigger. Everyone else in the thread is wrong and you are right xD. What is your problem with the statement that Unraid does not updates cve as quickly as other distros? Is a reality, why do you get mad? Everything else about unraid being vulnerable now is only on your poor head. I think you actually have real mental issues so I will stop responding you here. Good luck
  10. Poor kid, now you get mad? Where I said that UNRAID is vulnerable? I said that it follow an insecure vulnerability management policy. Learn the difference and grow up. Your problem is a lack of basic understanding in security and therfore you are mixing things up. Everyone's else understood my stament and some people even agree with me. So please move on and go to troll to another forum
  11. That could be a little bit optimistic. Lets assume the normal setup of an average user. Lets use a pentester mindset. Once you breach a container basically you have access to the whole network so I don't need to break docker to reach the host. Once in the network I might have access to Unraid GUI, SSH, FTP, SMB (remember when the default config of samba in unraid wan't secure a coupe of years ago? not because a CVE but due to config) Other container services Other physical devices in the network Other VM's Etc. There are too many posibilities and some of them can be prevented having a OS properly maintained. The other problem is that there are ton of people that doesn't upgrade unraid because they are afraid of breaking things (which happens a lot)... this is why regular OS have LTS versions with security patches at least guaranted.
  12. well you can panic depending on how the CVEs can be exploited and where in your network is the FreeBSD. Still the fact is that Unraid doesn't care at all about CVEs and that could be quite bad, maybe not too bad for people who knows how to harden their environments but for noobs, since Unraid is aiming mainly for this kind of customers. I understand that doing this in slackware for them can be a lot of work but is a irresponsability from their side promote the use of unraid to install things like plex, home assistant, jellyfin immich, netxcloud, and you would want those probably publised to internet and don't care about the basics of keeping unraid patched. What happens if there is a vulnerability in any of these apps? with docker and the SO unpached... is a recepy for a disaster at some point. I mean how many post do you see here and in reddit of people asking for help to publish someting hosted in unraid and they don't even know how to open the ports of their routers, or what are the implications of that.
  13. I don't understand your arrogance, but you will learn something today That is the problem, now one cares about your setup and no one is talking about your particular use case, if you don't have services hosted in Unraid exposed to internet of course reaching unraid will require the compromise of another asset in your network. But the problem is that there is many people exposing services hosted in Unraid to internet, and we have no assurance that the host is properly hardened and Unraid as a "company" is doing a propper vulnerability management, probably not because they never release patches with security updates, the release Unraid updates whenever they can and it comes with the patches of the last months, that means that Unraid has CVE for months not being patched. So the evidence is clear and is a fact that vulnerability management is not done by Unraid, they don't release security updates out of the regular updates. Crystal clear. Regading hardening, (configuration management), I doubt they are doing it, looking at the changes in the past but I don't have the proof, I havent scanned Unraid agasint DISA stig or CIS or any other hardeninig guide. Don't worry I will explaint you what is hardening in a second. I have used Nmap and Nessus and qualys among others professionally for years, maybe is my fault because I was assuming that you have a basic knowledge about security and I didn't extend a lot my explanation. I was trying to be kind and explain in case you or others didn't know that for free you have a better option than nmap to scan the vulnerabilities in your environment, not only a unauthenticated network scan that is what nmap does. I know perfectly what Nessus is capable and its plugins Plugins | Tenable® not only for vulnerability management but for hardening. Arrogance and ignorance are bad partners. So you talk about defense in depth and you mention 2 network security controls, IPS/IDS and traffic encryption. This is the youtube level knowledge of defense in depth. So basically you have 2 security controls in one of the layers of defense in depth. Can you call it defense in depth? well innacurate but yeah... I didn't complain about it the first time you wrote it, but then you were so arrogant to say that you know what defense in depth is and I had no idea. So where it is configuration and vulnerability management in defense in depth, they are in the host/device/compute layer. And configuration management (hardening) involves many things but basically is ensure the secure configuration of the assets. for example you can follow the recomandation of DISA, or CIS or whatever you preffer Complete STIG List (stigviewer.com) Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Security Technical Implementation Guide (stigviewer.com) Sadly there is nothing for slackware becuase is not used by almost anyone but most of the controls are valid among different distros. In any case you have the same for ubuntu, debian, suse... Bonus track, I'm sure you know how an IPS works, and that 90+% of the rules of the IPS are created to work with unencrypted traffic, so in order to have an effective IPS you need to do SSL offloading (traffic decryption) in you IPS, if not only a few basic rules will work and app detection based on SNI (which can be easily faked). The same happens with a WAF. So if you want to use the IPS to be effective you have to deploy certs in unraid, dockers, vms, ideally deploying an internal PKI and configuring ssl offloading or traffic decryption in your FW (in case the IPS is there).
  14. Unless you are doing ssl offloading in your IPS, is going to see only the 1% of what is happening. That is your use case but I guess many people publish or want to publish services hosted in unraid to internet, and vulnerability and hardening in the host is also defense in depth. Nmap won't detect anything serious or not obvious but you can use Nessus scanner essentials for free up to 16 IPs.
  15. Is docker vdisk (docker.img) a concept introduced by unraid or is a native feature of docker? I have been trying to find documentation regarding this on google but I can't find anything.
  16. With the small footprint of unraid it wont happen't even weekly but it will happend. Writing a few mb in a USB stick won't broke it, it could still last a decade if you look at the TBW specification of the devices. That "strange" idea of compose is the way docker is meant to be run, and is more convinient and easier to manage than "docker run", it's a standard. For the users would be transparent, for the community apps, maintainers or more advance users, would be a complete advantage.
  17. LoL so a minimun security is a fancy thing? I'm not asking to add anything in the distro, not a single new package. If they don't plan to do a properly support of the distro an alternative would be to base Unraid in a distro that will do what work for them. You could still build unraid base on Arch, using exactly the same packages but you will get security updates in hours not months.
  18. I know exactly what Unraid is, but whatever you want to call it, is still a server. I'm refering to the intrinsic securty of the OS, not to the addition of other security tools. The concept of dockerman is fine, the problem of dockerman is that is based on docker run and not docker compose so you have to rely on unsuported and community dockers instead on the offial ones in many cases, particularly when the app requries more than one container. So you still use dockerman the same UI but the backend should be docker compose. NAS capabilities is the only thing being developed in Unraid the last 4-5 years, or even more. Docker, VM's, networking, etc are untouched. Regarding CVE and security see my post above.
  19. Do you consider Unraid stable? Do you follow what happens in the forums after each release? Unraid not being as secure as a standard distro is a fact for 3 reasons: Unraid devs have stated several times in the forums that Unraid is not intended to be used to publish services to internet. Why? at least 2 reasons but there could be more a) Unraid doesn't go through any hardening process, redhat, ubuntu are verified against security frameworks (DISA,CIS) before release to ensure that the defaults are safe. Unraid does not, we just asume that the OS is safe, but actually no one knows, no ones cares. b) Have you ever seen an extraordinary release of Unraid to patch a CVE? I have never seen one and I have been around many years. The CVE persist in unraid for weeks or months just waiting for the next regular release to be patched or not. With a "standard" distro you get those in hours. This is a fact, end of the story 😊
  20. I think this draw is more clear In this case the containers inside the docker bridge network would be visible to the firewall? Or docker bridge mode will NAT everything? I mean if a container in docker 0 communicate with a container in docker 1, what source an dest IP will I see in the firewall?
  21. another question if the variable TZ is defined in the env file as TZ=whatever since both have the same name, will this work? or do I need to declare it like this - TZ=${TZ} I think it works but I can find it documented... so...
  22. with compose it looks like this is working volumes: - /mnt/user/Docker/Plex:/config - /mnt/user/Video/Películas/:/media/Películas:rw - /mnt/user/Video/Movies/:/media/Movies:rw - /mnt/user/Video/Series/:/media/Series:rw - type: tmpfs target: /transcode tmpfs: size: 2000000000 I don't see disk writes while transcoding by plex, but If I remove them I can see a constant 1-2 mb/sec of writes by plex transcoder process in htop. Is there any other way to check that is working? it looks like tmpfs is not using /dev/shm
  23. Anyway I just thinking further in case someday I migrate docker compose out of unraid. Another question is regarding the env file https://docs.docker.com/compose/compose-file/05-services/#env_file Are you doing something in the background so the env file is loaded automatically if it in the same folder than the docker-compose.yml? If I migrate this to a generic docker compose installation will I need to add "env_file: .env" under the services section? or if it is in the same folder is a native behaviour of docker to pick it up automatically? I really appreciate your patience with me
  24. That doesn't make any sense, if you go to freebsd what happens with docker? and virtualization? bhyve is not as good and tested like kvm. With a linux based OS more supported than slackware it would be easier for the users to do things with Unraid that not features available.
  25. ultra minor bug https://docs.docker.com/compose/compose-file/03-compose-file/ compose manager should support alternative file names for compose files, compose.yaml (preferred)